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INTRODUCTION
The Commerce Clause is one of the most cited constitutional provisions and has
been applied to a myriad of state activities to justify federal government regulation.1
It seems nearly impossible to locate a practical limit to the definition of interstate
commerce,2 especially with the interconnectedness of our modern economy. One
application of Commerce Clause regulatory power, the Endangered Species Act
(ESA or the Act), has been the subject of great controversy.3 Opponents of the Act’s
far-reaching applications have introduced various bills and amendments to counteract
the federal regulation, including the ESA Settlement Reform Act being considered
by Senate and House subcommittees as of November 2016.4 Continuing the struggle
between the federal government and private property owners, an organization
representing private property owners in the state of Utah is making a strong argument for limiting federal regulation when it comes to prairie dogs that reside only
within the state.5 An intrastate species challenge has yet to make its way to the
1

See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, The Likely Impact of National Federation
on Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 979 (2013) (“[S]ince the New Deal
era, the Court has sustained all major Commerce Clause legislation . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
2
Jeffrey H. Wood, Recalibrating the Federal Government’s Authority to Regulate
Intrastate Endangered Species After SWANCC, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 92 (2003)
(quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Sentelle, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998)).
3
Damien M. Schiff, The Endangered Species Act at 40: A Tale of Radicalization, Politicization, Bureaucratization, and Senescence, 37 ENVIRONS 105, 106, 131 (2014).
4
See H.R. 585, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 293, 114th Cong. (2015) (This bill would put
additional requirements on citizen suits against the federal government for failure to perform
a duty related to an endangered species. The government must publish the complaint, give
affected parties reasonable time to intervene, and not allow the court to award litigation costs
in a settled citizen suit).
5
See Amicus Curiae Brief of Mountains States Legal Foundation in Support of Appellee
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Supreme Court, but previous cases challenging the constitutionality of the ESA have
paved the way for such a challenge to occur.6 A few pesky prairie rodents provide
the perfect opportunity for a Supreme Court clarification of the limits of the ESA
and to create a logical stopping point for interstate commerce regulatory power.
The Utah prairie rodent problem provides an opportunity to define a stopping
point by clarifying the appropriate target of the Substantial Effect Test. This test is
used to determine whether the activity in question has a strong enough connection
to interstate commerce to make federal regulation constitutionally valid.7 This seemingly simple determination often becomes complex and highly controversial when
the federal regulation in question involves a “non-commercial” focus such as the protection of endangered species.8 When the regulation under judicial review involves
prohibitions stemming from the ESA, the Substantial Effect Test could focus on the
regulatory scheme as a whole, the specific regulated act, or the animal itself as an
object in commerce.9 As is illustrated by People for the Ethical Treatment of
Property Owners v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service (PETPO),10 only focusing
the Substantial Effect Test on the specific regulated act provides any hope of establishing a consistent stopping point for federal regulatory power garnered from the
Commerce Clause.11 Focusing on the overall regulatory scheme or the animal as an
article in commerce allows the federal government to stretch its rightful regulatory
powers to ridiculous situations and endangers the system of federalism guaranteed
by the Constitution.12 There is also a strong policy argument for setting a limit to
Commerce Clause regulatory power as the states are often better equipped to respond
to local issues and have a higher stake in resolving the issue in a way that both protects
the environment and preserves the local economy.13
This Note will examine the development of the Commerce Clause federal regulatory power and how its interpretation has changed throughout the years with the
increasing interconnectedness of our society. This Note will also explore the source
of federal authority for the ESA and litigation involving the classification of specific
regulated species as purely intrastate or interstate animals. As this Note examines
Urging Affirmance at 3–5, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 14-4151).
6
See, e.g., Darren Botello-Samson, You Say Takings, and I Say Takings: The History and
Potential of Regulatory Takings Challenges to the Endangered Species Act, 16 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 293, 303–09 (2006) (arguing that Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), would open the gates for
further challenges to the constitutionality of regulations that aim to protect intrastate species).
7
See infra Section II.B.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See infra Part IV.
10
57 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014).
11
See infra Section IV.B; Part V.
12
See infra Sections IV.A, IV.C.
13
See infra Section V.B.
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the three different ways to apply the Substantial Effect Test in ESA cases, it will
become evident that the Utah Prairie Dog situation provides an excellent opportunity
for the Supreme Court to clarify the limits of interstate species regulation. This Note
contends that focusing the Substantial Effect Test on the specific regulated act would
best fulfill Congress’s purpose in enacting the ESA while also preserving state sovereignty over purely intrastate issues.
I. PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF PROPERTY OWNERS V.
UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE
A. The Prairie Dog Invasion
The Utah Prairie Dog is a small burrowing rodent ranging from one to three
pounds that lives in large colonies with extensive underground tunnel systems.14
“[T]he westernmost species of prairie dog[,]” the Utah variety is found only within
the southwestern corner of the state.15 The Utah Prairie Dog was added to the endangered species list in 1973 and downgraded to a threatened species in 1984.16 Under
federal regulations, the “taking” of Utah Prairie Dogs is only allowed on agricultural
lands, private property within a half mile of conservation lands, or when the animal
“create[s] serious human safety hazards.”17 Any taking in these designated areas must
be approved by the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (the Service) in writing
before it occurs.18 The current problem arose when prairie dogs began moving out
of rural grasslands and into urban areas such as Cedar City, Utah.19 “The town [of
Cedar City] has been inundated with prairie dogs that are leaving parks, gardens,
vacant lots, the golf course and even the local cemetery pockmarked with burrows
and tunnels.”20 In another area, the town of Parowan, Utah, reportedly has a population of 2,790 people and 3,435 prairie dogs.21 Due to the prairie dog invasion, property values in Parowan have significantly diminished, causing homeowners to suffer
steep losses when attempting to sell their homes.22 The animals have also burrowed
14

Endangered Species: Utah Prairie Dog, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www
.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/species/mammals/utprairiedog/ [https://perma.cc/92AN-HUSL]
(last updated Nov. 6, 2013); see Amy Joi O’Donoghue, Cedar City Strikes Back at Utah
Prairie Dog Listing, DESERET NEWS UTAH (Apr. 18, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.deseret
news.com/article/865578529/Cedar-City-strikes-back-at-Utah-prairie-dog-listing.html?pg
=all [https://perma.cc/K92E-HMHP].
15
Endangered Species: Utah Prairie Dog, supra note 14.
16
Id.
17
50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(2) (2016).
18
50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(3)(iii), (4)(i)–(ii) (2016).
19
O’Donoghue, supra note 14.
20
Id. (quoting Jonathan Wood, attorney of the Pacific Legal Foundation).
21
Jim Carlton, In Utah, a Town Digs Deep to Battle Prairie Dogs, WALL ST. J., May 7,
2012, at A1.
22
See Dan Gallo, Utah Residents in Battle to Rid Town of Prairie Dogs, FOX NEWS
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holes in the airport runway, causing public safety concerns.23 Despite the significant
damage caused by the rodents, locals are prohibited from relocating the prairie dogs
under the federal regulation’s take provision, and towns have spent hundreds of
thousands of dollars attempting to build underground fences to keep the animals
out.24 When these efforts proved unsuccessful and citizens could find no other legal
recourse, a public interest organization made up of Utahns injured by federal regulation
of the Utah Prairie Dog, challenged the constitutional validity of the ESA’s Utah
Prairie Dog regulation.25
B. Current Litigation
The plaintiffs claim that the federal government is prohibited from regulating
the Utah Prairie Dog because it is a purely intrastate species and the taking of the animal does not have a significant effect on interstate commerce.26 The defendants agree
that the animal in question is purely intrastate, but claim the power to regulate the
taking of prairie dogs because economic activities have been prohibited by the ESA,
and the animal has biological and commercial value that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.27 The district court focused its analysis on the taking of prairie
dogs as the regulated activity with a possible substantial effect on interstate commerce instead of the regulation as a whole.28 The opinion stated that United States
v. Lopez29 requires the court to look to the actual activity being regulated rather than
the effect the regulation preventing that activity has on interstate commerce.30 The
court deemed the defendant’s argument about the biological value of the prairie dog
too attenuated to show a substantial effect.31 The court also held that “[t]he possibility of future substantial effects of the [intrastate noncommercial species] on interstate commerce, through industries such as medicine, is simply too hypothetical and
attenuated from the regulation in question to pass constitutional muster.”32 The
(June 26, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/26/endangered-prairie-dog-outnumber
-residents-in-utah-town.html [https://perma.cc/327U-7G8E].
23
Carlton, supra note 21, at A1.
24
Id.
25
See Petition for Review and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 57 F. Supp.
3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00278-EJF).
26
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1340.
27
Id. at 1341, 1343.
28
Id. at 1344.
29
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
30
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549).
31
Id. at 1345.
32
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622,
638 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005)).
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opinion shows a very cautionary approach to extending the Commerce Clause
authority to speculative areas.33 If the case had been heard in a less conservative
state than Utah, the deciding court may have had a more difficult time invalidating
the federal regulation than it seemingly had. To the defendant’s final argument, the
court stated that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not justify the regulation
because “takes of Utah prairie dogs on non-federal land—even to the point of
extinction—would not substantially affect the national market for any commodity
regulated by the ESA.”34
The Service appealed the invalidation of the Utah Prairie Dog regulation and the
case was argued before the Tenth Circuit on September 28, 2015.35 The district
court’s decision invalidating the prairie dog regulation was a significant moment in
ESA litigation. United States Courts of Appeals have previously upheld ESA regulations of species ranging from the Delhi Sands Fly to the red wolf,36 and the
Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari to an intrastate species case.37 Predictions
of such a grant of certiorari have yet to come to fruition.38 However, the tides may
be changing as the PETPO case provides the perfect opportunity for a Supreme
Court ruling on the issue. The Utah Prairie Dog is decidedly intrastate and has no
current economic or scientific value.39 It is also not humans that wish to invade the
prairie dog’s habitat, like in most endangered species cases, but rather the prairie
dog who is encroaching well-established human habitations.40 Although the case
focuses specifically on species regulation, a Supreme Court ruling would have a
significant impact on the struggle between federal and state regulation of activities
that hold a somewhat hazy connection to interstate commerce.
33

See id.
Id. at 1346.
35
See Lindsay Whitehurst, As Endangered Species Court Battle Looms, Utah Trapping
Prairie Dogs from Overrun Town, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 27, 2015, 11:46 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/09/27/after-ruling-utah-removing-hundreds
-of-prairie-dogs [https://perma.cc/6R76-KEFX].
36
See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1145 (2001); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
37
See Dan A. Akenhead, Federal Regulation of Noncommercial, Intrastate Species Under
the ESA After Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne and Stewart & Jasper
Orchards et al. v. Salazar, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. 325, 326, 351–53 (discussing how circuit
courts have used different rationales to uphold regulations of intrastate species on the ESA
and commenting on recent species cases that the Supreme Court declined to hear).
38
See id. at 351–53.
39
See Jonathan Wood, A Federal Crime Against Nature? The Federal Government Cannot Prohibit Harm to All Endangered Species Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 29
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 79 (2015). But see Akenhead, supra note 37, at 344 (noting that Congress
may be concerned with “undiscovered scientific or economic” value) (footnote omitted).
40
See Carlton, supra note 21, at A1; O’Donoghue, supra note 14.
34
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II. COMMERCE CLAUSE DEVELOPMENT
A. Development of Interstate Versus Intrastate Commerce
The definitions of interstate and intrastate commerce began with that oft-cited
case Gibbons v. Ogden41 in which the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause
regulation power included the power of the federal government to regulate navigation on the nation’s waterways.42 In that case, the Court held that commerce includes
“commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations.”43 “Among the several
States” was defined as commercial activities involving two or more states.44 In the
Court’s opinion, Justice Marshall declared the large breadth of federal commercial
power and “made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by
warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather
than from judicial processes.”45 However broad his view of the Commerce Clause,
Justice Marshall likely did not foresee the power stretching to a small prairiedwelling rodent. Nevertheless, his warning about restraints coming from the political
process is certainly being played out in the modern federal versus state environmental regulation struggle.
A century later, the New Deal Era brought the Commerce Clause back to the
national stage. The Clause was used to invalidate many of President Roosevelt’s
labor and industrial regulations.46 The President responded to the barrier created by
the Court by proposing a plan to add six additional justices to the Court.47 In a sense,
Justice Marshall’s words proved to be prophetic, but in the opposite way. The
political process brought an expansion to Commerce Clause interpretation, rather
than a restraint on the power. The Court responded to the mounting political pressure and questionable job security by upholding the National Labor Relations Act
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.48 In this ruling, “[t]he Court concluded that
Congress could reach even non-commercial or local activities if doing so was ‘necessary and proper’ to carry into effect its regulations of interstate commerce.”49 This
41
42
43
44

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 193, 195–97.
Id. at 189–90.
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 981 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195,

203).
45

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197).
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 982 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
297–310 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
47
A. Frank Reel, Letter to the Editor, When a Switch in Time Saved Nine, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1985, at 26E.
48
301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
49
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 982 n.39 (citing NLRB, 301 U.S. at 36–37).
46
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ruling introduced the Substantial Effect Test for Commerce Clause application.50
Under this provision, even purely intrastate activities can be regulated according to
the effect on interstate commerce.51
B. The Substantial Effect Test
The Substantial Effect Test measures the constitutionality of a federal regulation
applied in a specific situation (such as the ESA prohibiting the taking of Utah Prairie
Dogs).52 The test is used to justify or invalidate federal regulatory power over
activities that are not commercial in and of themselves, but that are found to have
some “substantial effect” on true interstate commerce.53 Although the standard itself
is not found in the wording of the Constitution, courts have developed this test in an
attempt to find some standard definition of what actually affects commerce in our
highly connected commercial world.54 However well-intentioned, the actual application of the test, Pushaw and Nelson point out, is practically toothless as virtually all
statutes are found to meet the “substantial effect” standard.55
The application of the Substantial Effect Test has developed over the years. The
commerce power was further expanded in 1942, when the Supreme Court found that
federal regulatory power extended to a farmer growing wheat in excess of the federal
quota, even though the farmer consumed the wheat himself.56 The reason the Commerce Clause applied in this situation was because the Court held that “Congress could
determine the ‘substantial effect’ by aggregating all of the regulated activity (here,
home-grown wheat) nationwide.”57 This ruling made the federal commerce power
nearly unstoppable. Essentially all intrastate activities can be hypothetically aggregated
to create some substantial effect on interstate commerce. In the PETPO case, the government argued that aggregating the act of taking Utah Prairie Dogs with the taking of
other similarly listed species could have a substantial effect on interstate markets.58 This
argument is a logical extension of the Wickard ruling and has succeeded in multiple
50

See id. at 982 (citing NLRB, 301 U.S. at 34–40).
Id.
52
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
53
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 982.
54
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 976; infra
Section II.C.
55
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 982 n.44 (citing Grant S. Nelson & Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal
Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1, 79–88 (1999)) (noting that “the Court upheld every federal law enacted under the Commerce
Clause from 1937 until 1994”).
56
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
57
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 982 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28).
58
People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 57 F.
Supp. 3d 1337, 1346 (D. Utah 2014).
51
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endangered species cases.59 However, it will become apparent that aggregating
species’ impact is not always a winning argument.60
The broad grant of power in Wickard was extended even further by the Court
when it upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964.61 This began the rational basis standard
for evaluating an activity’s substantial effect on interstate commerce.62 Instead of a
higher standard of strict scrutiny, rational basis review only requires that there be
enough evidence to provide a rational argument that the activity in question has an
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.63 This standard provides for the approval
of most federal regulations, including many environmental laws.64
C. Searching for Limits
With the Rehnquist Court’s so-called federalism revival came a renewal of limitations on the federal commerce regulatory power. In United States v. Lopez and United
States v. Morrison,65 the Supreme Court invalidated statutes as overreaches of the
Commerce Clause.66 The Court in Lopez held that a regulation prohibiting the carrying of firearms near school zones “did not regulate activity that was ‘commercial,’
either of itself or as ‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.’”67
In Morrison, the Court invalidated a portion of the Violence Against Women Act that
provided a cause of action for gender-motivated violence.68 Applying the rational
basis test to this legislation, the Court determined that there was no rational reason
for labeling gender-based violence as commercial activity.69 These two cases struck
down specific federal laws with similar existing state counterparts.70
The next case in the substantial effect saga appeared in 2005. Gonzales v. Raich71
asked the question whether marijuana grown locally for personal consumption in
59

See, e.g., Ala.-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1276–77 (11th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998); see also infra Section IV.A.
60
See infra Parts IV & V.
61
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–62 (1964).
62
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 982–83 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S.
at 255–58).
63
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258.
64
See Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 983 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,
321–29 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147–58 (1971)).
65
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
66
Id. at 627; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).
67
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 983 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
68
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–19.
69
Id. at 617–18.
70
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 983 (citing Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical
Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879,
882, 892–97 (2005)).
71
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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compliance with state medicinal marijuana laws could be federally regulated under
the Commerce Clause.72 The Court in Raich ruled that the federal government could
regulate the use of this marijuana because “the California exemptions will have a
significant impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana.”73 The Court found marijuana use to have a more plausible direct connection
to interstate commerce than carrying a gun near a school zone or bringing a federal
cause of action for gender-based violence.74 However the reasoning in these cases
may have differed, the Court still applied a rational basis standard of review and
based its decision on the rationality of the evidence presented.75
Pushaw and Nelson attempt to make sense of the discrepancy between the Raich
decision and the Lopez/Morrison decisions by arguing that the Lopez/Morrison
framework is limited to recently enacted federal statutes and activities that “cannot
plausibly be characterized as ‘commercial,’ either by [themselves] or as part of a
larger economic regulatory scheme.”76 Basically, the Court did not view the connection to commerce as rationally sound. Upon this foundation, the next Commerce
Clause challenge was laid: the infamous protest against the Obamacare Individual
Mandate in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius.77 The
Court held that the Individual Mandate exceeded Congress’s power to regulate under
both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.78 While the Court
went on to uphold the mandate as a valid use of the taxation power, it declined to
extend the Commerce Clause to the regulation of inactivity.79 Chief Justice Roberts
stated: “[t]he Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from
cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably engage in particular transactions.
Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities,
remains vested in the States.”80 However, Justice Ginsburg wrote in her dissent that
the Court should take a deferential view when it considers “Congress’s judgments
about national economic and social welfare.”81 From this perspective, the Court
could have determined that Congress had a rational basis for deciding that the Affordable Care Act had a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce.82 As
is discussed below, whether the Court looks at the specific situation or the impact
72

Id. at 5, 9.
Id. at 29–30.
74
See id. at 23–25 (referring to the activities as “quintessentially economic”).
75
See id. at 22.
76
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 984 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 15–32).
77
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
78
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 985 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–93 (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)).
79
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591, 2594 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
80
Id. at 2591.
81
Pushaw, Jr. & Nelson, supra note 1, at 987 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609, 2615–
17, 2619 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part)).
82
Id. (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609–28).
73
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of the regulation as a whole often determines whether there is a rational substantial effect on interstate commerce.83 The real test for the success of a federal commercially
based regulation may be what the court chooses to use as the activity in question
when it applies the Substantial Effect Test. This is the fundamental disagreement
that many Commerce Clause battles return to, whether the government is regulating
medical insurance or prairie rodents.84
III. APPLYING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION THROUGH THE ESA
A. Legal Foundation for the ESA
The ESA was originally passed in 1973 to provide a system of classifying
endangered and threatened plant and animal species and to afford classified species
federal protection.85 The Act was passed after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was upheld, but before the creation of the Lopez/Morrison framework in 1995 and 2000.86
During this time, Congress made use of the new rational basis standard of review
established by Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States87 by expanding federal
power to regulate the environment.88 The Act included broad regulations regarding
the “take” of listed species and any destruction or modification of species’ critical
habitat.89 Subsequent amendments have made minimal changes to the Act,90 but the
courts’ interpretation of the regulatory authority granted by the Act has substantially
broadened since its adoption. For example, “courts have construed section 9 [harm to
the species via critical habitat modification] broadly to include even unintentional
harm to an endangered species.”91
In 1981, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause power “permit[s]
congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.”92 This ruling
83

See infra Part IV.
Infra Part IV.
85
Endangered Species Act: A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/esa-history.html [https://
perma.cc/X5QJ-RRTM] (last updated Aug. 23, 2016).
86
See supra Sections II.B–C.
87
379 U.S. 241(1964).
88
See id. at 255–58.
89
See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, §§ 7(a)(B), 9, 87 Stat. 884
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2012)).
90
Endangered Species Act: A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, supra note 85.
91
Wood, supra note 2, at 96 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys., 515 U.S.
687, 696, 708 (1995)).
92
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981) (footnote omitted).
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demonstrated the broad reach of the Commerce Clause in environmental and species
regulation. Even after Lopez and Morrison demonstrated that some limits to federal
Commerce Clause power do exist, two cases upheld the power to regulate intrastate
activities related to species protection.93 In National Ass’n of Home Builders (NAHB)
v. Babbitt,94 the circuit court applied ESA section 9 to regulation of the Delhi Sans
Flower-Loving Fly residing only in California.95 In ruling that the regulation was a
valid use of the Commerce Clause, the court looked at “the aggregate effect of the
extinction of all similarly situated endangered species.”96 The court held that potential
medical discoveries and other future benefits from the fly species were enough to
justify federal regulation.97
B. Application of the Act to Various Species
In Gibbs v. Babbitt,98 a federal red wolf breeding program came under judicial
scrutiny when the wolves migrated onto private property and threatened livestock.99
This case differs slightly from NAHB in that the wolves were not intrastate, but
clearly exercised interstate movement.100 Similarly to NAHB, the court examined the
aggregate effect of the actual taking of the wolves in upholding the federal government’s power to regulate the species.101 The court stated that taking red wolves
would affect tourism, commercial pelt trade, and possible scientific research.102 The
standards developed by these cases led to the federal government’s favorite approach to applying the Substantial Effect Test: focusing on the regulation as a whole
and the effect the overall legislation has on interstate commerce.103
Another landmark case for federal species regulation, Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, was
decided in 2001.104 In this case, abandoned gravel pits had become seasonal ponds
that served migratory birds.105 The Army Corps of Engineers refused to issue a
permit needed to develop the site and the developer challenged the Corps’ authority
93

See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 487, 492–97 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1145 (2001); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
94
130 F.3d 1041 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
95
Wood, supra note 2, at 101–02 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1043).
96
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046.
97
Id. at 1052.
98
214 F.3d 483 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
99
Wood, supra note 2, at 103–04 (citing Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488–89).
100
See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490.
101
Wood, supra note 2, at 104 (citing Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493–94).
102
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
103
See supra Section II.B.
104
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
105
Id. at 162–63.
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to regulate the ponds.106 The Corps argued “that the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ falls
within Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activities that ‘substantially affect’
interstate commerce.”107 The Court ruled that the Clean Water Act could not be
extended to these ponds because it “would result in a significant impingement of the
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.”108 The Court cited
Lopez and Morrison to reach the controversial conclusion that the federal Commerce
Clause regulatory power does have some limits.109 When the SWANCC decision was
issued, it received a variety of interpretations in the academic world.110 Some commentators warned that it would open the floodgates for federalism challenges to
federal environmental regulations, creating a virtual “race to the bottom” as states
sacrificed environmental quality to entice industries to locate within their jurisdiction.111 While such warnings have thus far proved unnecessary, it may be that the
Court is awaiting a truly intrastate species challenge in which no economic development is being regulated. In that case, the PETPO challenge is the perfect opportunity
to clarify the bounds of the Commerce Clause and environmental regulatory power
by defining the application of the Substantial Effect Test.
C. Connecting the Endangered Species Act to Other Commerce Clause Decisions
Commerce Clause substantial effect challenges to the ESA and environmental
regulations in general could take some reliance on Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius.112 Ginsburg argued that the Court should apply a deferential standard to areas where Congress is regulating an issue related to national
“economic and social welfare.”113 Environmental quality and the protection of endangered species could be seen as valid social welfare issues even if they do not substantially affect economic welfare. Although the Court need only find that a rational
basis for the regulation exists, it remains unsettled what specific aspect of the
regulation needs to provide the substantial effect element. Some cases have examined the regulation itself and its aggregate effect on interstate commerce.114 Other
106

Id. at 163–65.
Id. at 173.
108
Id. at 174.
109
Id. at 173.
110
Compare Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to
Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 241 (2001) (predicting that a case would arise in
which the Court would have to address the direct challenge that federalism poses to environmental protection), with Wood, supra note 2, at 108–09 (arguing that courts will be reluctant
to use SWANCC to invalidate existing intrastate species regulation).
111
Adler, supra note 110, at 224.
112
Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609–77 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
113
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2609, 2615–17, 2619.
114
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (1997)
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cases have viewed the species itself as an article of commerce.115 A third perspective
is highlighted in the PETPO amicus briefs and is illustrated by Morrison: relying on
the actual taking of the animal in question as creating a substantial impact on
interstate commerce due to actual or potential social or economic value.116 Determining which perspective will be taken has a significant impact on the outcome of the
case. In PETPO, the distinction will decide whether or not the federal government
will be allowed to continue regulating the taking of Utah Prairie Dogs.
IV. THREE METHODS OF APPLYING THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT
TEST TO INTRASTATE SPECIES
When it comes to regulating a purely intrastate species, the object being evaluated is crucial. Considering the aggregate effect of similar legislation is likely to
bolster the federal government’s argument, while viewing the animal itself as an
article of commerce is likely to aid the state’s argument. Using the effect of what is
actually being regulated in the immediate case is more fact-specific and open to
interpretation. However, the court’s decision does not always fit neatly into one of
these three options. As is discussed below, courts often combine methods of evaluating substantial effect or even state that a substantial effect exists without explaining
which method was used to reach this conclusion.117
A. The Regulation Itself as the Activity in Question
1. NAHB v. Babbitt
The most obvious viewpoint and the one most often argued by the federal government is that the regulation itself (in our case, the ESA) has a substantial effect on
(finding that protecting all of the endangered species as a whole has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce).
115
This view has succeeded in district court cases, including Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp.
2d 531, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1145 (2001). While the circuit court ultimately rejected the holding that red wolves were
“things in interstate commerce,” this is an argument that advocates continue to make. See
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
116
Amicus Curiae Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Appellee Urging
Affirmance at 14–15, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 14-4151); see also United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
117
See, e.g., Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1067–68 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“In
focusing on the second NAHB rationale, we do not mean to discredit the first. Nor do we
mean to discredit rationales that other circuits have relied upon in upholding endangered
species legislation. We simply have no need to consider those other rationales to dispose of
the case before us.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
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interstate commerce.118 As discussed previously, NAHB v. Babbitt illustrates this
argument.119 The species being protected in that case was the Delhi Sands FlowerLoving Fly.120 San Bernardino County intended to build a hospital on newly purchased
land that was found to be prime Fly habitat.121 Although the county received a permit
from the Service to build the hospital, constructing an intersection nearby would
cause “a ‘taking’ of the Fly in violation of ESA section 9(a).”122 The plaintiffs challenged this “take” prohibition as an unconstitutional use of regulatory power.123 The
plaintiffs’ argument relied heavily on the Lopez decision “that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 . . . exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.”124
In evaluating the substantial effect prong in this case, the court examined the
legislative history of the ESA.125 The plaintiff argued that the ESA exists in order
to protect biodiversity, “including the potential medicinal benefits.”126 Besides possible
future medical discoveries, the district court noted that the Fly was displayed in
museums, was the subject of scholarly articles, and attracted researchers from outof-state.127 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the extinction of a species had the potential to substantially affect commerce.128 The court also focused on the aggregation
of all species being protected by the ESA and the destructive effect on interstate competition if these animals were destroyed.129 In upholding the ESA’s application, the
court likened the destruction of endangered species to the destruction of farmland in
Hodel v. Indiana.130 The court stated that both the ESA and the Surface Mining Act regulate activities that are “likely to have destructive effects on interstate commerce.”131
Judge Sentelle’s dissenting opinion argued that the regulation itself “does not
control a commercial activity, or an activity necessary to the regulation of some
commercial activity.”132 Here one can see the contrast between two different methods of analysis. The majority focused on the aggregated provisions of the Act itself
118

See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1050.
See id. at 1041; see also supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
120
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1043.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1045.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1050–51.
126
Wood, supra note 2, at 103 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052).
127
Id. at 103 n.82 (citing John C. Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 181 (1998)).
128
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052.
129
Id. at 1054–57.
130
Id. at 1055–56 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (upholding the Surface
Mining Act requiring special mining precautions to be taken on land designated as “prime
farmland” as a valid use of Commerce Clause regulatory power)).
131
Id. at 1056.
132
Id. at 1064 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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as affecting interstate commerce.133 Judge Sentelle on the other hand, looked at the
specific activity being regulated here: the taking of Flies.134 Judge Sentelle interpreted Lopez as requiring a “case-by-case inquiry” for intrastate commerce challenges.135 The judge also gave a nod to the third method of analysis by stating that
the Fly is not an article in interstate commerce.136 As illustrated by this case, once
a broad perspective is taken by analyzing the entire act rather than the specific
situation, it is fairly easy to argue that small connections to commercial activity can
be aggregated to reach the substantial effect benchmark. While scientific discoveries
and tourism are cited examples,137 any number of activities can be deemed as potentially impacting interstate commerce. Two cases involving fish species illustrate
other ways of applying the regulation-focused test.138
2. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne
The controversy in Alabama-Tombigbee v. Kempthorne139 involved deciding
whether two fish, the Alabama Sturgeon and the Shovelnose Sturgeon, actually constituted separate species.140 If the Alabama Sturgeon was a separate species, it could
rightfully be listed as endangered.141 The court looked at the ESA as a whole in
reviewing the facts that led to the agency’s listing decision and found that there was
“a rational basis for believing that regulation of an intrastate activity was an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”142 The court stated that the Alabama Sturgeon itself had little or no commercial value but the Substantial Effect
Test was to be applied to the regulation rather than the object regulated.143 Similarly
to NAHB v. Babbitt, the court reasoned that the possibility that taking endangered species could have an impact on national markets was sufficient to justify the endangered
species regulation.144 In this situation, the fact that the fish existed in Alabama’s
rivers could possibly “stimulate commerce by encouraging fishing, hunting, and
tourism.”145 At one time, the Alabama Sturgeon had been commercially fished and
133

See id. at 1046, 1054, 1056 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1060–67 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
135
Id. at 1064 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
136
Id. at 1067.
137
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
138
See infra Sections IV.A.2–3.
139
477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008).
140
Id. at 1252.
141
Id.; see also Ala.-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Norton, 338 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 & n.4
(11th Cir. 2003).
142
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d at 1277.
143
Id. at 1271–73.
144
Id. at 1272. The court commented that Congress has never been required to “legislate
with scientific exactitude.” Id. Thus a rational basis for such impact is enough to sustain the
regulation. See id. at 1277.
145
Id. at 1274.
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the goal was to return the population to a level that would allow commercial fishing
to resume.146
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the rational basis
standard to Congress’s initial decision to create the ESA.147 Considering the entire
regulatory scheme is an easy way to validate any species regulation, even a species
that is entirely intrastate with no economic value. If the examined act was the actual
regulation of this specific species, the regulation would need more factual support
to pass as a valid use of Commerce Clause regulatory power. In this situation, the
previous commercial use of the fish and the possibility of a market for game fishing
is potentially enough to uphold even the specific regulation of this species itself.148
However, the argument would be much more difficult to make for the Utah Prairie
Dog which has never been a game animal and whose pelt is very unlikely to ever
create a commercial market.149
3. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar150 also concerned a
threatened fish species (the Delta Smelt), but here the plaintiff challenged the impact
of the regulation on multiple state water projects.151 The state was not allowed to
provide irrigation for nearby orchards by controlling the water flow in the delta
because it could cause incidental taking of the protected smelt.152 Almond, pistachio,
and walnut growers sued the government for the damage that the lack of water had
caused to their crops.153 The government responded that “[t]he ‘no-jeopardy’ provision
in ESA section 7 requires an agency to ensure that any action it takes ‘is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species.’”154
Despite the economic damage that the smelt regulation had created on the side of the
growers, the court looked to the entirety of the ESA to uphold the regulation prohibiting the taking of smelt.155 The court cited Kempthorne while also stating that
“future and unanticipated interstate commerce value of species” supports the ESA’s
authority to regulate intrastate species.156 Similar to Kempthorne, it was the overall
146

Id. at 1253, 1276.
Id. at 1277.
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See id. at 1271–72.
149
See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & the Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop.
Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 14-4151).
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638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011).
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Id. at 1167–68.
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Id. at 1168.
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Id.
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Id. at 1171 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012)) (footnote omitted).
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Id. at 1177.
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Id. at 1176 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178–79 (1978); United
States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)) (footnote omitted).
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impact, both actual and potential, of the ESA as a whole that satisfied the substantial
effect test.157
4. Questioning the ESA as a Whole in the Prairie Dog Case
The defendants in PETPO argue that regulating the take of the Utah Prairie Dog
is “essential to the economic scheme of the ESA.”158 In the alternative, if the regulation of only prairie dogs does not prove to be a significant part of the regulation, the
defendants argue that excluding all intrastate species from the regulation would
“substantially frustrate the ESA’s comprehensive scheme.”159 Although these arguments
focus on the validity of the ESA, they call into question the role of this specific
species rather than the entire regulation. The district court denied this argument and
instead chose to focus on the effect that taking prairie dogs has on interstate commerce rather than the connection between commerce and the ESA.160 The court
demonstrated that specific parts of the Act can be invalidated while still upholding
the validity of the overall regulatory structure.161 However, the district court’s approach
remains a minority position among the entirety of species regulation challenges.162
If the Tenth Circuit (or the Supreme Court, should the case reach that level)
chooses to focus on the application of the intrastate endangered species regulations
as a whole, the federal government is likely to succeed in its argument that the prairie
dog regulation is a valid use of Commerce Clause regulatory power. Under this
regime, there would effectively be no limit to the reach of the ESA. Such a decisive
ruling from the highest court would point us back to the question discussed in NAHB
v. Babbitt: why would anyone “make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause
instead of the ‘hey-you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like’ clause?”163
B. The Specific Regulated Act as the Activity in Question
The next way that a court could approach the Substantial Effect Test is considering
the specific act being regulated and the effect that this act has on interstate commerce.
As opposed to the previous facial challenge to the regulation as a whole, this approach
157

Id. 1176–77.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 57 F.
Supp. 3d 1337, 1341 (D. Utah 2014).
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Id. at 1341 (citation omitted).
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Id. at 1344–45.
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Id. at 1346.
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See supra Sections IV.A.1–3.
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Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (1997) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume 19, 19 HARV. J.L. PUB.
POL’Y 1, 5 (1995)).
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can be seen as an as-applied challenge.164 First, the court must decide which activity
is actually being regulated: the physical taking of the animal in question or the desired
activity (such as a commercial development) that is effectively being prohibited by
the endangered species regulation.165 Next, the court must examine the chosen activity and evaluate the effect of the target activity on some form of interstate commerce.166 Several cases have taken this approach to endangered species regulation
with varying results.
1. GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton
In GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton,167 the Service listed “five subterranean invertebrate species [Cave Species] as endangered under section 4 of ESA[.]”168
The Cave Species are found only within two counties in Texas and do not play a role
in any current commercial market.169 Scientific research has been conducted on the
Cave Species and several scholarly articles have been published regarding the findings.170 The issue in the case arose when a private party intended to develop a
section of property where the creatures were known to live.171 The Service ruled that
the development would constitute an illegal taking of the Cave Species and subsequently denied the developers an incidental take permit.172
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to Lopez and Morrison in evaluating
the “attenuation of the link between the intrastate activity and its effect vel non on
interstate commerce.”173 The court stated that there are two ways in which an activity
may be found to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce: the specific activity
by itself may have such an effect or the activity may be aggregated with other
similar activities to find a substantial effect.174 In order to determine the effect, the
164

Id. at 1064 (arguing that the Lopez test requires “case-by-case inquiry” to assess the
effect on interstate commerce).
165
See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the key question is “what constitutes the ‘regulated activity.’”) In GDF Realty, it was
either the taking of “six species of subterranean invertebrates found only within two counties
in Texas” or the planned commercial development for the area where the species existed. Id.
at 624–26, 633.
166
This step could include considering an aggregation of the activity in question or
possible future ties to commercial activity, similar to the analysis conducted under the overall
ESA regulation approach. See, e.g., id. at 637.
167
326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
168
Id. at 625.
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Id.
170
Id.
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Id. at 624–26.
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Id. at 626.
173
Id. at 628–29 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000)).
174
Id. at 629. The first method follows the as-applied method while the second aggregation
method is a way of finding the regulation as a whole to be valid or invalid. See id.
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court must first decide “what constitutes the ‘regulated activity.’”175 The Court of
Appeals held that the activity in question was the “expressly regulated activity,”
meaning the actual taking of the Cave Species, as opposed to the prevented commercial development as the target activity.176 The court noted that it was important to
consider only the activity regulated in this specific situation because “looking primarily beyond the regulated activity . . . would ‘effectively obliterate’ the limiting purpose
of the Commerce Clause.”177
Although the court focused its analysis on the take provision rather than the
ESA as a whole, it still found the Cave Species take prohibition to be an “essential
part” of the ESA.178 The court noted that the species may play an unforeseen role in
the overall ecosystem and that allowing takes of all similar creatures could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.179 The court essentially combined the overall
regulation method and the specific regulated act method to find that the reasoning
behind the specific regulation was logical enough to justify an exercise of Commerce Clause regulatory power.180 GDF Realty illustrates the ingenuity often used
by courts to combine multiple approaches to the intrastate species question to ultimately
find that the federal regulatory power has no limitation.
2. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton
Another intrastate species case decided in 2003 took a different approach to the
question of what activity is actually being regulated. In Rancho Viejo, LLC v.
Norton,181 a California real estate developer wished to construct a housing development in an area that was a known habitat for the endangered Arroyo Southwestern
Toad (Toad).182 The Toads are clearly an intrastate species as they reside near the
creeks where they breed and none have been found outside of the state of California.183 The Service refused to approve the developer’s site plan because an erected
fence could prevent the movement of the Toads between habitats.184 The Service
ruled “that construction of the fence ‘[had] resulted in the illegal take . . . of federally
endangered’ arroyo toads.”185
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals looked to its 1997 NAHB v. Babbitt decision
to focus its substantial effect analysis on the activity being prohibited by the species
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 633.
Id. at 633–36.
Id. at 634 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 57 (1937)).
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id. at 638–40.
323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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regulation, the commercial development.186 Since prohibiting the taking of the Toad
effectively shut down “the construction of a 202 acre commercial housing development[,]” there was clearly a substantial effect on interstate commerce.187 The court
justified its choice of the commercial development as the activity in question by stating
that “[n]othing in the facts of Morrison or Lopez suggests that focusing on plaintiff’s
construction project is inappropriate or insufficient as a basis for sustaining this application of the ESA.”188 The court also noted that the Commerce Clause allows the
ESA to “achieve noneconomic ends through the regulation of commercial activity.”189
Chief Judge Ginsburg’s concurrence added the caveat that there is a “logical stopping
point” to the court’s decision about what affects interstate commerce.190 Although
the residential development in question clearly affected interstate commerce, “the lone
hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property, though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate commerce.”191
3. Focusing on the Taking of Prairie Dogs as the Activity in Question
The approach taken by the district court in PETPO was to focus on the actual
taking of prairie dogs as the activity that must uphold the Substantial Effect Test.192
The court cited Gonzales v. Raich in holding that “[t]he proper focus of the ‘substantial effect’ test is the ‘regulated activity.’”193 Using this as-applied method, the court
considered the defendant’s argument that the Utah Prairie Dog plays an important
role in the ecosystem, could attract out of state tourists, and could someday be used
186

Id. at 1067–68 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998)).
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Id. at 1068, 1070.
188
Id. at 1072.
189
Id. at 1074.
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Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Judge Sentelle’s dissent in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt states that the Lopez substantial effect test requires that:
the rationale offered to support the constitutionality of the statute (i.e.,
statutory findings, legislative history, arguments of counsel, or a reviewing
court’s own attribution of purposes to the statute being challenged) has
a logical stopping point so that the rationale is not so broad as to regulate
on a similar basis all human endeavors, especially those traditionally
regulated by the states.
130 F.3d at 1064 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
613 (2000)).While many courts have neglected this requirement, it is imperative that future
judicial decisions consider the logical stopping point of the ruling in order to maintain the
bounds of Federalism and to avoid the appearance of judicial tyranny.
191
Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
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People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 57 F.
Supp. 3d 1337, 1344 (D. Utah 2014).
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Id. at 1344 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005)).
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to support a significant scientific discovery.194 However, these arguments “miss[ ]
the mark” of the specific regulated act standard.195 Claims of mass disruption to the
ecosystem or that hypothetical medicinal breakthroughs will be thwarted by the
removal of prairie dogs from non-federal lands can only succeed under a broad
regulation-based approach.196 The court stated that these claims are “simply too
hypothetical and attenuated from the regulation in question to pass constitutional
muster.”197 Even if the Utah Prairie Dog was found to play an important role in
tourism, the vast majority of this activity occurs on federal land where the take
provision in question does not apply.198
The narrow focus on the specific taking in question provides the “logical stopping point” in federal Commerce Clause regulatory power that Chief Judge Douglas
H. Ginsburg highlighted in Rancho Viejo and Justice Sentelle’s dissent pointed out
in NAHB v. Babbitt.199 Unlike cases such as NAHB v. Babbitt, the law prohibiting
the taking of prairie dogs is not prohibiting a large commercial development from
destroying the rodent’s habitat.200 In contrast, it is the prairie dogs themselves who
have moved from the protected federal land into agricultural and urban areas.201 The
only activity prevented by the ESA provision is the physical taking of problem
prairie dogs.202 When a federal provision is being challenged, it is certainly logical
to consider what the provision actually provides rather than hypothesizing about
unsubstantiated connections to other areas of commerce. Limiting judicial scrutiny
to the specific case in question provides a “logical stopping point”203 and ensures that
situations like “the lone hiker in the woods”204 do not become suddenly regulated
under federal Commerce Clause power.
It is the Utah Prairie Dog take prohibition that provides the perfect opportunity
for the courts to draw a logical stopping point line in the sand. Recent Supreme Court
decisions such as NFIB v. Sebelius, indicate that the current Court may be willing
194

Id. at 1344–45.
See id. at 1344.
196
See supra Section IV.A.
197
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1345 (quoting GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d
622, 638 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005))).
198
Id. at 1345–46.
199
See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Ginsburg, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130
F.3d 1041, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
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See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1044–45, 1058.
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See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 9(a), 87 Stat. 884, 893–94
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Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
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to reign in federal regulatory power and protect state sovereignty.205 The principles
of federalism require that “regulations affecting local citizens should have a nexus
with local government.”206 The Utah Prairie Dog is a purely intrastate species with
no substantial effect on any national market.207 The State of Utah also currently
implements a Prairie Dog Management Plan including regulations providing a permitting process for limited takes of prairie dogs on non-federal lands.208 Thus, the
federal take prohibition is an unnecessary overreach of federal regulatory power.
Choosing PETPO as the case to limit federal power under the ESA would leave the
Act largely intact as very few species hold the same position as the Utah Prairie Dog
while still preserving the foundational principles of federalism and state sovereignty.
4. Focusing on the Damage Caused by the Prairie Dogs that Continues to Occur
Because of the Regulation Against Taking the Rodents
The defendants in PETPO argued in the alternative that the rule preventing the
taking of prairie dogs prevents various commercial activities from occurring.209 The
rodents have infiltrated pastures and fields to the point where agricultural use is no
longer feasible and has prevented development plans from being implemented in
residential areas.210 Apart from the activities indicated by the appellees, the prairie
dogs have also destroyed airport runways; toppled gravestones and disrupted funeral
services; and have reduced property values in many local areas.211 The prohibition
against taking prairie dogs has certainly impacted interstate commercial activities,
but the impact is quite different from that cited in other intrastate species cases. In
205

Brief of the State of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee and Affirmance
at 7, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 57 F.
Supp. 3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 14-4151) [hereinafter Brief of the State of Utah et al.]
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balanced state. The remaining four or eight years of the Trump Administration coupled with
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will pull the Court into a conservative-leaning position. Under this new regime, there will
be a greater willingness to reign in federal regulatory power and the Court may finally entertain
a significant Commerce Clause challenge.
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most cases, it is a land developer that is attempting to move in and disrupt a creature’s habitat.212 In the Utah Prairie Dog situation, the rodents have moved out of the
remote areas and onto public and private property.213 The take prohibition prevents
citizens from protecting their property and threatens public health and safety.
It may be argued that the prairie dog situation is similar to the situation in
Christy v. Hodel214 where citizens were prevented from taking federally protected
grizzly bears in order to protect their livestock.215 In Christy, the court held that the
plaintiff did not have the right to protect his own property from destruction caused
by “federally protected wildlife.”216 However, this decision was not based on a
Commerce Clause substantial connection to interstate commerce, but on the determination that the killing of plaintiff’s livestock by federally protected grizzly bears did
not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.217 The court noted that the plaintiff’s loss
was incidental to “reasonable regulation in the public interest.”218
The current Utah Prairie Dog regulation does not meet the standard of a “reasonable regulation in the public interest.”219 It is not only a prohibition against landowners exterminating the rodents, but also against moving the rodents to federal
reserve areas where the creatures can thrive.220 The government has not shown that
the supposed public interest of prohibiting prairie dog takes on non-federal property
outweighs the clear public interest of maintaining public streets, airport runways,
and ensuring that the rodents do not spread disease throughout the communities.221
The plaintiff in PETPO also does not argue for government compensation due to a
taking of private property by a federally controlled species.222 The only connection
the court needs to consider in this situation is what projects would be occurring in
the absence of the federal take prohibition. Looking hypothetically to a world in which
the State of Utah was allowed to manage prairie dog populations on non-federal
212

See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (addressing
the attempted development in an area that would harm Cave Species), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
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See People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1340 (D. Utah 2014).
221
Defendants argue that the Utah Prairie Dog serves as prey for other animals in the
ecosystem and “attracts some interstate tourism.” Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). However,
the district court stated that hypothetical connections to interstate commerce are not enough
to justify the regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1344–45.
222
See id. at 1339–42.

2017]

OF PRAIRIE DOGS AND CONGRESSMEN

1145

land, there would be much less of a need to continually repair airport runways and
replace cemetery markers toppled by rodents.223
However, even in this hypothetical world, the current rendition of the Commerce Clause as the “hey-you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like clause”224 could be
used to uphold the federal regulation. ESA proponents could argue that the prevention of property destruction gives the take prohibition a substantial connection to
interstate commerce because now localities do not need to bring in pavers and gravestone manufacturers to fix the problems caused by prairie dogs, therefore depriving
the market of interstate commerce. Such an argument does not follow from the
current liturgy of intrastate species cases, but is a foreseeable future extension of
federal regulatory power. If this is the future of intrastate species litigation, perhaps
our framework for defining interstate versus intrastate needs to be reevaluated.
C. The Regulated Animal as an Article of Commerce
A third way that courts could measure the Substantial Effect Test is by viewing
the animals themselves as “things in interstate commerce.”225 From this perspective,
the court will ask if the animal itself or any information or product garnered from
the animal moves in interstate commerce.226 This view differs from the first perspective in that it does not look at the regulation itself, but looks only to the object of the
regulation.227 This third perspective also deviates from the specific regulated act
view in that it examines whether the animals themselves have a direct substantial
relationship with interstate commerce.228 However, as is the case with the previous
two methods of analysis, this view may be combined with pieces of the other two
perspectives to create a multifaceted approach.
1. Gibbs v. Babbitt
The district court decision in Gibbs v. Babbitt illustrates an application of this
theory.229 The case involved federally protected red wolves that migrated onto
private property and threatened people and livestock.230 The ESA restricted citizens’
223

See Carlton, supra note 21, at A1.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
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Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000)). While the district
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ability to take the wolves in an attempt to protect themselves and their property.231
Although the court of appeals rejected the argument that the wolves were themselves
articles in commerce, the court held that “[t]he taking of red wolves implicates a
variety of commercial activities and is closely connected to several interstate markets.”232 Since the wolves physically crossed state lines, the court of appeals probably could have followed the district court decision and declared the red wolf to be
an interstate species and called it a day.233 In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court of appeals rejected this approach and instead considered current and possible
future economic connections between the species and commercial activity.234 The
Fourth Circuit found that red wolf tourism, scientific research, and the possibility
of one day reviving the commercial pelt trade created a relationship between takings
of the wolf and interstate commerce.235
Even though this method of analysis has not seen much success at the appellate
level, there is significant room for interpretation should the animal successfully be
considered such an article in commerce. One must decide how “the animal” will be
defined. This determination could include only the physical animal moving on its
own volition or it could include the information (i.e., scientific discoveries or tourists’
happy thoughts about the creature) gained from the animal’s existence that crosses
state boundaries in a non-physical form.236 The district court in Gibbs considered the
wolves “things in interstate commerce” not just because they crossed state lines, but
because possible tourism and future scientific discoveries followed them across
those lines.237 Thus, when an animal is found to move on its own accord, courts
theoretically may be more willing to find tenuous connections to interstate commerce
enough to create a substantial effect and validate Commerce Clause regulation.
2. Utah Prairie Dogs as Articles of Commerce
It is difficult to argue that Utah Prairie Dogs are articles in commerce under the
Gibbs district court regime as they are burrowing creatures who have not been
shown to cross states lines on their own.238 However, in this age of ever-expanding
231
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federal regulatory power, it is conceivable that the Service would argue that the
rodents could one day cross state lines, either physically or in the form of an out-ofstate tourist sharing his vacation slides with reluctant relatives in Oklahoma. Or
perhaps a golden eagle could scoop up an unsuspecting prairie dog and deposit the
rodent in her Arizona nest. Under this method of analysis, once the rodent has physically crossed state lines, it is very easy to find some sort of connection to interstate
commerce and validate federal regulation that curtails state authority. In PETPO, the
district court rejected hypothetical arguments about such possible connections to interstate commerce.239 While the Utah Prairie Dog situation does not lend itself easily
to this method of analysis, the opinion illustrates the need for the courts to finally
draw that “logical stopping point” for federal Commerce Clause regulatory power.240
If such a limitation is not set, any movement across state lines, however minor or
seemingly natural, will be used to uphold federal intervention.241
V. SETTING A CLEAR STANDARD FOR THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT TEST IN ORDER
TO PRESERVE LEGITIMATE FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY POWER
In evaluating the application of federal Commerce Clause regulatory power in the
context of interstate and intrastate species, I contend that the courts have stretched the
power too far. Although courts have found that the ESA as a whole is a valid use of
regulatory power, the power to regulate purely intrastate species rightfully belongs
to the states.242 As Chief Judge Ginsburg stated, there must be a “logical stopping point”
to this seemingly omnipotent federal regulatory power.243 To ignore such a limit is
to cripple our system of federalism and to deny the very basis of the Commerce Clause
as a whole: that there is a substantive difference between interstate and intrastate
commerce. Even in our highly connected modern world where ideas and goods flow
freely across state lines, there are some activities that remain purely intrastate.
The PETPO case serves as an opportunity to provide a much needed kickback
to the continual expansion of the Commerce Clause and set a defining limit.244 In
order for the Commerce Clause to avoid becoming the “hey-you-can-do-whateveryou-feel-like clause”245 in the specific application of the ESA, the Supreme Court
239
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needs to set a standard for what specific activity is the basis of the Substantial Effect
Test. Three methods have been presented for determining the activity in question:
focusing on the regulation itself, the specific act being regulated, or the animal as
an article of commerce.246 As we have seen, the method chosen to define the activity
in question greatly affects the outcome of a case. The Court can use the PETPO case
to define the regulated act as the activity in question and preserve a small sector of
state-only regulatory power.
A. Using the Specific Regulated Act as the Standard for the Substantial Effect
Test Defines a Logical Stopping Point
If the Substantial Effect Test is based on the endangered species regulation as
the activity in question, there will never be an effective limit to federal regulation
in this area.247 Any new prohibition of individual action that supposedly affects a
threatened species will be deemed constitutional merely because it is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.248 There will effectively be no evaluation of individual circumstances and the consequences of government action.249 As several cases
have shown, even true intrastate species may be federally regulated when the regulation
itself is the activity in question.250
Basing the Substantial Effect Test on the regulated animal as an article in commerce would also fail to create any meaningful limit.251 If the animal (or products
derived from the animal) is being commercially traded across state lines, there is no
question that the species affects interstate commerce. In situations where no clear
commercial trade is occurring, arguing that the animal is an article in commerce relies
largely on future connections to commerce such as possible tourism or a scientific
discovery.252 It is extremely difficult to weigh the effect that hypothetical activities have
on interstate commerce. Resigning the courts to this type of inquiry is highly impracticable and would not provide any clear stopping point to federal regulatory power.
In contrast to the above methods, the proper focus of the Substantial Effect Test
is on the specific act being regulated. Using this standard necessitates a case-by-case
analysis rather than an overarching approval of federal regulation.253 Under this
standard, the court must evaluate the target of the regulation and whether allowing
246
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or disallowing that specific activity has an actual effect on interstate commerce.254
In the PETPO case, the activity to be evaluated is physically moving Utah Prairie
Dogs from private property to federal preservation land and preventing their reentry
in private areas.255 If such activity is intrastate, it falls under state regulatory power
and precludes federal regulation. Although many ESA regulations would certainly be
upheld under this standard, it would preserve state sovereignty in cases of purely intrastate activity. This distinction is the entire basis of the Commerce Clause and should be
the standard for evaluating any regulatory scheme based on this grant of federal power.
B. Implications of a Clear Standard and Related Environmental Concerns
Focusing on the specific regulated act allows a case-specific evaluation of the
species regulation in question.256 The Commerce Clause provides that intrastate
species regulation power resides with the states.257 This power will certainly be challenged in specific situations because proponents of the federal regulation will argue
that there are great policy concerns that necessitate federal intervention in a given
case. The case-by-case approach addresses the policy side of the argument for federal
regulation of a given species. Rather than approving of a federal species regulation
merely because it is part of a larger federal regulation, a court will examine both the
federal and state responses to preserving the species in question.258 When there is
evidence that a state is preserving a species on its own, the challenge will fail for both
lack of intrastate regulatory authority and a strong policy justification.
In the Utah situation, the state already requires certification of registration in
order for a person to lawfully take a Utah Prairie Dog.259 The Utah Division of
Wildlife Resources has also implemented a comprehensive plan for managing the
population of Utah Prairie Dogs and preserving habitat according to the species’
historic range.260 This plan was created through the cooperation of the Utah Department of Natural Resources, U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management,
and several other federal and local organizations.261 The state of Utah is clearly
254
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concerned with preserving the Utah Prairie Dog species and has willingly worked
with federal agencies to develop the current state regulation.262
Using the specific regulated act as the focus of the Substantial Effect Test provides for state-based approaches to localized issues while preserving federal power
to address national concerns.263 However important an environmental issue may be,
it does not justify a violation of state sovereignty when there remain alternative
avenues to address the concern. The evaluation of these alternatives should not be
excluded by focusing on the overall regulatory scheme, but should be left for the
court to consider in each individual case.
CONCLUSION
The strange occurrence of prairie rodents destroying Utah cemeteries provides
an opportunity to reevaluate the current state of federal regulatory power. The Commerce Clause provides the federal government with broad regulatory power over
interstate activities, but this power is not without limits. The distinction between
interstate and intrastate activities is vital in preserving federalism and legitimate
state authority. The standard chosen for the application of the Substantial Effect Test
determines whether that distinction is maintained. I contend that the proper focus of
the Substantial Effect Test is on the specific regulated activity in question. Using this
standard will provide a “logical stopping point”264 for what truly affects interstate
commerce. The specific regulated activity standard preserves the federal government’s overall authority to protect species through the ESA, but also maintains state
regulatory authority in purely intrastate species preservation.
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